Book review: Horst Teltschik: The 329 days to German unification The complete diary with reflections, flashbacks and outlook

The approximately 1000-page work (Michael Gehler, editor, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlag 2024) is a highly interesting read for attentive contemporary witnesses, critical observers and young trainee historians and diplomats. A first, very truncated version of Teltschik’s diary was published by the Jobst Siedler Verlag in the early 1990s. There was also only one edition of this. The complete edition, which is now available, is based on retrospectives, flashbacks and an extensive interview that the editor and historian at the Hildesheim Institute of Contemporary History, the Austrian Professor Michael Gehlen, conducted with Teltschik in 2023. Teltschik’s complete diary is enriched by an excellent annotation apparatus by Gehler and provides the reader with a fascinating insight into one of the most exciting periods of German and European history.

It traces in detail how, with the help of Horst Teltschik, Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s closest foreign and security policy advisor alongside Rudolf Seiters, Wolfgang Schäuble, H.D. Genscher et al., the path to German reunification was paved and the foundations for a new peace order in Europe – 44 years after the end of the Second World War- were laid. Teltschik, foreign and security policy advisor to Helmut Kohl (Chancellor from 1982) from 1971 to 1990, paved the way for German reunification with his sure political instinct, his unorthodox and courageous approach to complex political problems, his keen powers of observation and his creative thinking as part of a team work. Examples include his draft for the Chancellor’s 10-point declaration to the Bundestag on November 28, 1989, shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall 9.11.1989, but also his drafts, memos and extremely skillful negotiations and secret fact finding missions on behalf of the Chancellor to the Soviet Union, Hungary, most of the Warsaw Pact states, as well as his visits to the USA, which initiated and facilitated a strategic turnaround in Europe within a short period of time. The book gives us a lively insight into the countless meetings prepared by Teltschik with the most important strategists and heads of government in Europe and the USA under President Ronald Reagan, President George Bush senior, his Secretary of State Baker, NSC advisor Brent Scowcraft and Robert Blackwill (White House), without whose active assistance the historic turnaround would not have been accomplished. The reader is given a precise profile of various heads of government – e.g. Miklós Neméth, Prime Minister of Hungary, who was a pioneer and a stroke of luck for Germany – and without whom the Berlin -Wall would not have fallen. As early as September 1989, the Hungarian government had the border posts in Soprón on the border with Austria knocked down, ensuring that tens of thousands of GDR citizens were able to get through this bottleneck to the West

The reader also gains an excellent insight into the thinking and actions of various Western European governments, such as the French government under President Mitterand and his closest advisor Attali, with whom Teltschik (alongside Elisabeth Guigou and Hubert Védrine) was in constant contact; as well as a very accurate picture of government action under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who initially made no secret of her opposition to German reunification, as well as the Netherlands under Rudd Lubbers, but also Italy under Andreotti. This was in contrast to the supportive attitude of the Spanish head of government Félipe Gonzalez, Jacques Santer in Luxembourg and Martens in Belgium. It was also Teltschik who, accompanied by the then head of Deutsche Bank, the intellectually very open-minded Alfred Herrhausen (tragically killed by the RAF November 30^th 1989), an early advocate of a debt solution in Latin America, traveled to Hungary on a secret mission towards the end of 1988 and negotiated a loan for the government under Miklós Németh, which was beset by economic problems. During the same period, he visited most of the Warsaw Pact states as part of a “fact finding mission” for the Chancellor and finally, together with Kohl, visited the Soviet Union under the newly elected General Secretary Gorbachev, who was striving for major reforms with his perestroika.  All these countries were struggling with a severe economic crisis at the time and were looking for a way out of their financial bottlenecks.

This became particularly clear during the visits to Moscow and meetings with Michael Gorbachev, but also during the meetings with the former Soviet Ambassador Kwizinskij in Bonn  and Valentin Falin’s  emissary Nicolai Portugalow (1989), who during his visit to Bonn on 21.10. 1989 drew Teltschik’s attention to the explosive domestic political situation in the Soviet Union at an early stage and asked for urgent financial aid, linked to a conceptually new approach to solving the German question.

For every serious historian and aspiring diplomat, the book is an “indispensable” tool that provides an insight into the question of how a given historical moment – the fall of the Berlin Wall on  November 9, 1989 –  that was brought about by the peaceful uprising of millions of people  in the GDR,  it was thanks to “individuals”, including Helmut Kohl, his advisor Teltschik alongside Seiters, Schäuble, Genscher and an excellent team of officials under Teltschik’s leadership, a handful of bankers, as well as a couple of US politicians and advisors such as Brent Scowcraft and Bob Blackwill, and on the soviet side Michail Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Schewardnaze, who were able  to take advantage of the historic moment and make the reunification of East and West Germany possible in a breathtakingly short time (329 days) and thus lay the security policy foundations for a new peace order in Europe.

Teltschik’s path into politics

After Kohl’s election as head of government on Oct. 1, 1982, Teltschik became ministerial director of the “Foreign and Intra-German Relations, Development Policy, Foreign Security” department in the Federal Chancellery. The following year he became deputy to Waldemar Schreckenberger, chairman of the Federal Chancellory as well as to Wolfgang Schäuble and Rudolf Seiters. From 1999-2008, he took over the management of the Munich Security Conference (MSC), where Teltschik succeeded Ewald von Kleist, the founder of the MSC (1963), in bringing together leading heads of state and governments from East and West and many parts of the world (Asia, Latin America, Middle East). Teltschik was closely associated with Gorbachev until his death (August 2022) and also had interesting discussions with President Vladimir Putin; among other things, he had a significant influence on Putin’s celebrated speech to the Bundestag in 2001, in which Putin spoke of the vision of a Russia cooperating closely with Europe. He met Putin in Sochi in 2006. He had written a very impressive letter to Merkel about this meeting, which Merkel, who had the most contacts with Putin during her term as Chancellor, unfortunately left unanswered. In 2007, he invited Putin to Munich for the MSC conference, where Putin gave a memorable speech in which he warned of a future characterized by “unipolar” action.

Assessments of Teltschik

The editor of the book, Prof. Michael Gehler, in his introduction notes that Teltschik, who tended to stay in the background at official photo opportunities and was not ego-driven like, for example, German Foreign Minister H.D. Genscher or other contemporaries: “With his quiet diplomacy, he was not an official envoy, but a skilled mediator,” while Stefan Creuzberger (“Das Deutsch- Russische Jahrhundert”, 2022) commented: “Teltschik deeply regretted the fact that Putin had started the war against Ukraine as a serious mistake, but also saw the West as responsible for the escalation of developments in view of the longer history.” (Gehler p.19) In his “Memoirs”, Helmut Kohl described Teltschik as “my most important foreign policy advisor and one of my closest colleagues (…) Foreign and security policy, as well as European and German policy, were Teltschik’s passion. In 1989/90 in particular, he discreetly handled a number of sensitive and important missions on my personal behalf with a sense of responsibility and negotiating skills.” The well-known British historian Timothy Gordon Ash judged from his perspective: “Equipped with detailed knowledge and greater analytical sophistication than Kohl, Teltschik understood and accepted the overall system of Ostpolitik that they had inherited from Brandt and Schmidt, and wanted to develop it further: the central triangle (Bonn-Moscow-Berlin) within the larger triangle (America-Germany-Soviet Union), the priority of relations with Moscow and the imperative of synchronization.” (T. G. Ash “Im Namen Europas. Deutschland und der geteilte Kontinent”, 1993, Munich). He went on to say: “Kohl’s Bahr had called the motto ‘Moscow first’ – he knew that the key to German unity lay there, but that it also needed the support of Washington to break up the status quo of the division of Germany and Europe.”

Teltschik’s special ability, which Kissinger also held in high esteem, was his knowledge of human nature, quick perception and decisiveness in setting new priorities for strategic action. With his team in the department of the Federal Chancellery (period 1982 to 1990), Teltschik possessed the ability to conceptually get the best out of a given situation, to deal with problems in a solution-oriented manner and to implement strategically important ideas effectively and quickly. Even when he was no longer in this position, he relied on “creative brainstorming” with various dialogue partners in small groups. This was the only way he was able to create a genuine dialogue again and again, long after his work for Chancellor Kohl, such as in the Munich MSC (1999-2008), which his successors do not seem to be able to do. given the current tensions and differing strategic views.

Important milestones on the road to German reunification

In the mid-1980s, there were already various visits by Kohl and Teltschik to the Soviet Union (including to General Secretary Yuri Andropov shortly before his death 1984 EH) followed by a visit to the newly elected Soviet General Secretary Michail Gorbachev. The joint German-Soviet declaration of Bonn on June 13, 1989, which was preceded by a visit by Helmut Kohl to Moscow on October 24-27, 1988, marked the beginning of a new phase in the Soviet-German dialogue. Kohl proposed to Gorbachev a return visit to Bonn between June 12-15, 1989, which, according to Teltschik, “opened a new chapter in relations between Bonn and Moscow.”  The joint German-Soviet declaration from Bonn on June 13, 1989 stated, among other things: “The Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union are aware, in view of European history and the situation of Europe in the world, and in view of the weight each side has in their alliance, that a positive development of their relations with each other is of central importance for the situation in Europe and for the West-East relationship as a whole. In their desire to establish a lasting relationship of good and reliable neighborliness, they want to build on the good traditions of their centuries-long history. Their common goal is to continue, develop and deepen their fruitful cooperation and to give it a new quality.” (quoted from Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe, E.H.) Gehler notes in the book, that at Teltschik’s suggestion, at that time, Soviet generals spent several days in the Federal Republic of Germany, where they were able to visit the Bundeswehr facilities, with the aim of promoting cooperation and building trust. According to Gordon Ash, Teltschik was the architect of the Bonn Declaration, “which could be seen as a guideline for the course of European policy in the coming decades”, with which the Federal Republic had placed its political position vis-à-vis the USA and the USSR.

Shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall 9.11.1989 the Soviet journalist, Nicolai Portugalov, an emissary of the former Soviet ambassador to Germany Valentin Falin (1971-78), on the 21rst of November contacted Teltschik with proposals noted down on a piece of paper, that lined out some ideas for a future architecture of Germany within Europe. Terms such as “confederation” completely electrified Teltschik when reading Portugalov’s notes. He promptly briefed the Chancellor, urging him to immediately act. The result was the drafting of the famous 10- Point- program which Kohl presented in a speech in the German Federal Parliament on 28.11.89. As Teltschik in his diary, the reactions from Europe, but also from the Soviet Union, at that time were rather defensive and partly hostile: apart from Jacques Santer (Luxembourg), Belgium’s Willi Martens, Felipe Gonzalez and Delors, Paris and particularly London were rather hostile. Among the key points of the November 28, 1989 speech by Kohl in Parliament were: the idea of economic aid, once the GDR leadership had agreed on constitutional change and a new electoral law; “confederal” structures with the aim of creating a “federal-state order” in Germany; Germany as part of the architecture of Europe as a whole; the European Community as the basis for pan-European unification; further negotiations at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), disarmament and arms control and the creation of a “free, united Germany in a free and united Europe.”

Until the day of German reunification on October 3, 1990 (after which Teltschik resigned from the Kohl government at his own request), a combination of summit meetings had to be managed in parallel to the rapid changes that were taking place within the GDR. This included: The European Summit in Dublin (June 25-26) which pushed the idea of a comprehensive EU architecture further; the NATO Summit in London July 5-6^th that called for a transformation of NATO; the World Economic Summit in Houston July 9^th to 11^th.  This was preceded by a two-day informal summit with Kohl and Teltschik on February 24^th 1990.

It was indeed an arduous path of negotiations that were conducted in a short period of time, in order to promptly calm the concerns of various European heads of state, above all England, but also France, Italy and Poland, and to get the green light from both the USA and Gorbachev’s Soviet Union. According to Gehler: “Ultimately, concessions following a secret mission to Moscow with German bankers (including Dr. Röller -Dresdner Bank- and Hilmar Kopper -Deutsche Bank- EH) accompanied by Teltschik on 14th May 1990, were just as important as a Western agreement on the NATO summit declaration on June 18 1990, as a signal and in the run-up to the KPDSU party conference. The key focus in the discussions was always about the way in which a future Germany would be integrated into NATO, combined with an orderly withdrawal of Soviet troops from the GDR, the strength of the Bundeswehr, the two-plus-four talks (England, France, Soviet Union, USA), the status of Berlin and the future organization of the GDR as part of a reunified Germany in accordance with Article 23 of  Germany’s Basic Law; the question of Germany’s membership within NATO, without the former GDR territory being anchored in it; a final solution to the German -Polish Oder-Neisse border secured under international law, which was finally resolved by mutual agreement between Poland and Germany(14^th November 1990); and finally a major CSCE conference as a framework for a pan-European peace architecture.

The miracle of Moscow – a visit to Gorbachev in the Caucasus

A major breakthrough occurred when from July 14-16 1990 a meeting took place in Moscow and in the Caucasus between Soviet General Secretary M. Gorbachev and his delegation and German Chancellor Kohl, who attended with his delegation including the Ministers T. Waigel, H.D. Genscher as well as Horst Teltschik as well as other leading officials. The meetings took place in an atmosphere of mutual trust and relaxedness that evolved on the background of the beautiful landscape of the Caucasus. At a press conference organized July 16 in Mineralie Wodi, the German Chancellor together with Gen. Secretary Gorbachev gave an extensive press conference. Teltschik gives detailed notes about this event, at the occasion of which Chancellor Kohl outlined 8 points of common agreement:

“It is with pleasure and satisfaction that BK announces agreement with Gorbachev on eight points: 1. unification includes the Federal Republic, the GDR and Berlin. 2. after the unification is completed, the four-power rights and responsibilities will be completely replaced. The unified Germany would receive its full sovreignity (…) 5. the NATO structures would not be extended to the territory of the former GDR as long as Soviet troops were still stationed there. (…) Non-integrated units of the Bundeswehr can be stationed on the territory of the present-day GDR and in Berlin immediately after the unification of Germany. 6. For the duration of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of the former GDR, the troops of the three Western powers are to remain in Berlin; 7. in the ongoing negotiations in Vienna (MBFR), the Federal Government will make a declaration of commitment to reduce the armed forces of a united Germany to a personnel strength of 370,000 men within 3 to 4 years. The reduction is to begin when the first Vienna Agreement comes into force; 8.a united Germany will renounce the production, possession and disposal of NBC weapons and remain a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

Gorbachev emphasized two points in his introduction: “Today, German-Soviet relations are characterized by a high level of political dialogue and a certain degree of trust as well as an intensive exchange of opinions at the highest level… Much progress has been made in recent months and especially at this meeting” He further emphasized “the importance of the numerous summit meetings of recent months” and particularly emphasized the NATO summit, where very positive steps had been taken. He characterized it as a “historic turning point.  In a “spirit of mutual understanding” results at the meetings were achieved, which “would integrate the positions of both the FRG and the Soviet Union. … Both sides are realists.” Gorbachev reaffirmed that the “united Germany should be granted full sovereignty. This also included the decision as to which alliances it wanted to belong to and which relations it wanted to maintain. This was a hallmark of full sovereignty. Whether they wanted it or not, there would come a time when the real united Germany would belong to NATO if it so chose. Clarity had been achieved regarding the duration of the stay and the conditions of the Soviet armed forces. In this context, they assumed that NATO structures would not be extended to the territory of the former GDR. The Soviet forces were to be withdrawn as planned within an agreed period. There had been talk of 3 to 4 years. After that, no nuclear weapons and no foreign troops were to be stationed.”

Bush Sr. 1989: “Respect the legitimate security interests of the SU”

In a very detailed interview between Gehler and Teltschik in 2023, which one can read at the end of the book (45 hours in total at his home on Lake Tegernsee), the reader receives a great deal of atmospheric information. Teltschik shows his good insight into the thinking of the Soviet Union and Russia at one point in the interview (p. 754), where he emphasizes the importance taking “Russian security interests seriously,” which once again highlights the dramatic dilemma which we are facing in the war in Ukraine: “For Russia, the issue of security was always the key issue, whether justified or not. The great help that President Bush gave us without being asked, was his speech in Mainz on May 19, 1989. This major speech was not noticed as such in Germany and Europe. He said that the USA would respect the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. This key statement came at a time when nobody felt it needed to be emphasized. But to have said this and to have made clear that the USA did not see itself as an enemy of the USSR was, in my view, crucial to the overall process, that the issue of Europe was unequivocally linked to the issue of Soviet security (!). Later, we ourselves experienced that the breakthrough in the negotiations with Moscow was also linked to the fact that we were prepared to offer the USSR a treaty between a united Germany and the Soviet Union including clear security policy commitments in May 1990. I still remember how Soviet Ambassador Kwizinskij and Foreign Minister Shevardnaze reacted enthusiastically to this proposal.”  Elsewhere, Teltschik pointed out the paramount importance of the talks in the Caucasus: “The talks in the Caucasus were by far the high point of relations with the Soviet Union… In addition, we had achieved by far the most far-reaching disarmament and arms control negotiations in the years from 1989 to 1991.”

At one point in the interview, Teltschik was asked why the “Charter of Paris” had never been ratified. (The “Charter of Paris, on the creation of a new peaceful order in Europe, the keystone of the CSCE Special Summit,” was a keystone for developments in Germany and Europe. At this conference on November 21, 1990 in Paris, representatives of 32 states signed the Charter as a fundamental document for overcoming the division of Europe, based on the emphasis on the inalienable rights of man, increased economic cooperation, confidence-building measures and disarmament impulses. EH) Teltschik’s answer: “The proposal (for ratification) did exist.  One year after Putin attended the 2007 Munich Security Conference with me, Medvedev officially came to Berlin in 2008 for his inaugural visit as the new President. As already mentioned, he gave a key speech at the Hotel Adlon in Berlin and proposed that the “Paris Charter” be incorporated into a treaty. This would have achieved exactly what you are talking about. The response throughout the West was zero. Nobody reacted to it.”

Similarly, nobody reacted when, in response to the war in Ukraine, Teltschik, together with General Kujat, Peter Brandt, Michael von der Schulenburg and Hajo Funke, called for a peace agreement and a negotiated solution to the war between Russia and Ukraine. (20.9.23 https:// makroskop.eu / 30-2023 / a- groundbreaking- german-peace-proposal-for- ukraine / ) . In the interview, Teltschik commented that he knew Kujat well and “a lot would have been achieved if the proposals had been discussed with those responsible in the Federal Government. As expected, no reaction was received … that didn’t surprise me.” Many surprising insights and facts can be discovered in this voluminous work, which is highly recommendable to read.